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WARTIME DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS: ROLES OF FOCUSED LOGISTICS, VELOCITY MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIC DISTRIBUTION POLICY, AND AIR CLEARANCE POLICY

This strategy research project (SRP) uses the guidance in the current Focused Logistics
Campaign Plan to assess the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) and service policies on materiel consolidation and air clearance authority. The SRP argues that developing common DoD and services' policies for materiel consolidation and air clearance will result in a more effective joint distribution system.
After Operation Desert Storm (ODS), the U.S. Army took the lead in reviewing its supply chain process and implementing improvements through more effective practices and policies.
This new process improvement program was called Velocity Management (VM). VM enabled the Army to significantly reduce its peacetime customer wait time (CWT) for high-priority materiel. CWT segments span the entire strategic and theater distribution system. Policy and practices implemented at the strategic level significantly impact the effectiveness of the theater distribution system and defense transportation system (DTS).
JOINT LOGISTICS MUST BE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT
Future DoD logistics strategy is elaborated in the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan (2003) . This plan is designed to set a revolutionary joint and integrated course for the joint logistics community at the strategic and operational levels. It proposes future efficient logistics methods for the joint force. One characteristic of future logistics improvements is to "replace mass with speed and precision." 1 The current DoD logistics community remains a very non-joint system. U.S. Code Title X designates each service as the responsible agent for its logistics. Each service thus uses a service-unique supply chain management system -each with its own set of policies, procedures, and information systems. For example, at the operational and tactical level the U.S. Army uses the Standard Army Retail Supply System, the U.S. Marine Corps uses the Asset Tracking Logistic and Supply System, the U.S. Navy uses Relational Supply, and the U.S.
Air Force uses the Standard Base Supply System. Because of the disparity in these serviceunique systems, the services cannot rely on one another's systems either in garrison or in the field. These differences extend beyond their supply chain management systems; they are also reflected in service and DoD policies. Policy differences then create inconsistency in the DTS's handling of the services' materiel:
Presently, the DoD distribution environment consists of unsynchronized segments and distribution nodes, with rescheduling often required at each change of transportation node. DoD employs a myriad of discrete supply chains, but they are not harmonized at the enterprise level. This distribution environment places a heavy materiel-tracking burden on the customer, who usually lacks complete information and end-to-end visibility. This often creates unnecessary uncertainty and workloads at the point of receipt. When the point of receipt is an austere area of conflict, this situation can become especially critical. When the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines work side by side in the same region, as they did in Iraq, the combined supply system is a clashing mismatch of different cultures, incompatible communications systems, different stock numbers for similar items, even different vocabularies. Keeping track of a spare Marine Corps tank transmission as it moves from a Marine Corps depot to an Air Force cargo plane to an Army truck, for instance, "is one of our biggest challenges…It's a cultural issue, not a technology issue…" Christianson said. 5 The Government Accounting Office (GAO) has published a preliminary report on defense logistics in OIF. The report cites many joint logistics problems within the Iraqi theater of operations. GAO specified several contributing factors: poor asset visibility, limited theater distribution capability, failure to fix problems cited in lessons learned from ODS, and other various issues. GAO specifically noted materiel delays caused by the need to break down and repack arriving materiel, by problems in prioritizing cargo delivery, and by the inability of untrained personnel to get the job done in theater distribution centers: 6 The distribution of supplies was also delayed because cargo arriving in shipping containers and pallets had to be separated and repackaged several times for delivery to multiple units in different locations. In addition, DoD's lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for delivery precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation assets.
In addition, logistics personnel were not adequately trained in various logistics functions, such as operating material handling equipment and managing theater distribution centers.
Many problems that emerged during OIF were also evident in ODS, the supply chain system of which was based upon mass. But in the late 1980's industry began adapting new supply chain methods that included distribution-based methodologies. After ODS, the Army initiated a study called Total Distribution which resulted in the Total Distribution Action Plan.
This action plan was the genesis for current distribution-based logistics concepts employed by the Army; these concepts will likely shape the future force. 8 Subsequent to publishing this action plan, Army leaders commissioned the RAND Arroyo Center to begin studying the Army's supply chain in an effort to achieve immediate improvements. This effort resulted in the Army adopting VM. 
VELOCITY MANAGEMENT -DEFINITION AND HISTORY
VELOCITY MANAGEMENT -IMPROVEMENTS IN ARMY LOGISTICS
The VM initiative measured and analyzed critical segments within the supply chain.
Analysts understanding of the segment times and processes enabled them to improve the segment and then assess how much this refinement contributed to the total system. The segments were measured and analyzed with data from the Army's logistics intelligence file. The past method of evaluating CWT performance was simply one of calculating the overall average number of days it took for requested items to process from requisition date to ordering unit receipt processing. This method of evaluating only average CWT masked the variance in actual performance, a significant variation. Therefore, the VM effort adopted a now widely accepted group of four metrics to measure CWT in days. The new method used percentile measurements of 50%, 75%, and 95% along with the mean. The 50th percentile metric measures the median CWT -or the time it takes for the fastest 50% of the total items ordered to be receipted. The 75th percentile metric measures the CWT for the fastest 75% of the total items ordered. Lastly, the 95 th percentile metric measures how long it takes for customers to receive 95% of the total items ordered. The last five percent is excluded since it only accounts for outlying data related to various problems that skew the data analysis.
Over the course of six years from 1994 to 2000, the Army reduced its CWT by more than 50%. In 1994 the average CWTs for outside the continental United States (OCONUS) air shipments were 21 days, 28 days, and 59 days in the 50 th , 75 th , and 95 th respective percentiles.
In 2000 these average CWTs for OCONUS air shipments were reduced to 11 days, 14 days, and 22 days in the respective percentiles.
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© RAND. Reproduced with permission from RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
FIGURE 3. CUSTOMER WAIT TIME REDUCTIONS 1994-2000 17
These gains represented great improvements for the peacetime Army -both in improved readiness and in fiscal efficiency. In some cases these improvements led to reductions in forward stocking of materiel at installation, direct support, and unit supply levels as the Army adjusted inventory algorithms based upon faster replenishment times. 18 In addition, Army logisticians assumed that these improvements were systemic and would apply both in peacetime and during deployed operations. In a CASCOM article published in Army Logistician , "Velocity Management and the Revolution in Military Logistics," Thomas Edwards, the Deputy to the CASCOM commander, observes:
Although this discussion of the VM implementation has focused on actions taken to improve CONUS Order Ship Time (OST) in peacetime, many of these actions also helped improve OST for OCONUS units, including those in deployed operations. This was a natural consequence because most of the CONUS segments of the order and ship process are also part of the OCONUS process. The streamlining of ordering, depot processing, and receiving activities contributes to the reduction of both CONUS and OCONUS OST, as does the improved positioning and sourcing of stocks to accommodate the needs of major customers of the depots. Moreover, the same process changes that make peacetime performance faster and more reliable also contribute to fast, agile, and robust wartime performance. 19 RAND also analyzed whether reduced CWTs would hold true during contingency operations. RAND used data for the Army's deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo for its analysis. The RAND study sought the root causes for these increases of as much as 200% in CWT.
RAND found that Army operations in Bosnia and
RAND determined the primary causes were at both the strategic and theater levels. The RAND chart below shows how the strategic level DLA segments of MRO-Ship, SHIP-CCP, and CCPHold increased significantly from peacetime levels. The theater level PODship-D6S segment identifies the ineffectiveness of the theater distribution system. Interestingly, RAND determined that the theater distribution system was significantly affected by consolidation problems on 463L
pallets that occurred at the strategic level, prior to their shipment into the theater of operations.
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© RAND. Reproduced with permission from RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. In OIF, these varying packaging and pallet configurations led to significant theater distribution delays for materiel that was not multi-pack or pallet pure for each SSA. RAND's study showed that when the theater received multi-packs and pallets that were configured SSA pure, velocity was sustained. When pallets were received that were not SSA pure or if multipacks were mixed, the result was decreased receipt rates and theater segment delays. 36 But the RAND study concluded that if all echelons employ the VM principles, then the distributionbased supply system is more effective.
© RAND. Reproduced with permission from RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. To maximize throughput distribution to the supply support activity (SSA) level, cargo for each supply support activity (SSA) in the theater will be segregated onto separate pallets/containers to the greatest extent possible. 38 The 2003 RAND study of OIF logistics offers abundant evidence that strategic consolidation works to improve theater distribution performance. Even though the Army and DLA struggled to implement strategic consolidation during OIF, the effectiveness of the strategic consolidation is indisputable. This effectiveness did not go unnoticed by the joint community.
At the beginning of OIF, the U.S. Marine Corps requested DLA to begin using strategic consolidation for Marine shipments.
U.S. MARINE CORPS USE OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY CONSOLIDATION AND CONTAINERIZATION POINT DURING OIF
The U.S. Marine Corps supply chain remains rooted in a supply-based system rather than a distribution-based system. During OIF, the Marine Corps encountered similar problems as the Army did with materiel requiring multiple sorts at the operational and tactical levels:
Despite the dispersed nature of Division units (1 st Marine Division) across the battlefield, repair parts were often packaged in large "multipacks" with many parts for multiple units placed into a single box and container. This required additional handling at various nodes to redistribute parts, delaying their delivery.
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The original Marine Corps OIF plan called for all Marine Corps high-priority materiel to flow MILAIR-Loose. So unconsolidated materiel would flow to the CONUS APOE, pallets would be built at the APOE, pallets then were moved by the DTS to the OCONUS theater aerial port of debarkation (APOD), materiel would then be transloaded at the APOD by the Army, and then transported to the operational level Marine Logistics Command (MLC) located in Kuwait. The MLC would then sort the materiel at its distribution node. Per DoD Regulation 4500.9-R, Marine
Corps high-priority materiel should flow freely as loose items to the APOE, not through the DDSP CCP. 40 However, the Marine Corps requested a temporary policy change during OIF to allow their high-priority materiel to flow through the DDSP CCP for consolidation similar to the Army process. The Marine Corps believed this would allow its high-priority materiel to flow quickly through the theater transportation and supply nodes, thereby reducing friction within the DTS, Army theater distribution center (TDC) echelon, MLC echelon, and the tactical distribution level. Although delayed in implementation, this decision reduced CWT by at least three days: 41 Once the war started we realized that this (consolidation) was not occurring because the TDC or CRSP at that time was getting Marine Corps material embedded in Army and Navy pallets. Since I had just come from HQ DLA the summer of 02, I called MG Proctor who I worked for and he corrected the problem. What was taking about 5 days to get from the APOD and SPOD to the USMC distribution hub in Camp Fox, Kuwait eventually took less than 2 days. 42 Although Marines in the MLC realized a gain in effectiveness using strategic consolidation, no detailed CWT segment data supporting this is currently available. The Marine
Corps is currently conducting a comprehensive study on Marine Corps logistics during OIF.
More comprehensive data from this study is not yet available.
DOD POLICY FOR CONSOLIDATION AND CONTAINERIZATION POINT USAGE
Individual services have not established policies covering use of DLA's CCPs. Instead, DoD policy directs the services' use of the CCPs in DoD Regulation 4500.9-R. DoD Regulation 4500.9-R states the following about the use of the CCPs:
Since most shippers do not regularly generate full container or 463-L pallet loads of cargo for shipment direct to receivers, the CCP provides a means for combining shipments from multiple shippers. Consider sending these combined shipments directly to single consignees or, as a stop-off or BBP, for multiple consignees. The services and DLA have established CCPs in the CONUS to consolidate cargo for onward movement by SEAVAN or 463-L pallet. 43 The policy states that the DDSP will consolidate materiel for both the Army and Air Force as MILALOC will not flow through the CCP. 44 It is obvious that this portion of the DoD Regulation 4500.9-R was heavily influenced by service parochialism and gives little consideration of the potential joint benefit of strategic consolidation. This policy does little to standardize the way materiel is consolidated at the strategic level. It simply states how each service wants it done.
There is considerable evidence in both peacetime VM data and OIF data that strategic consolidation can make the theater distribution systems more effective. Using strategic consolidation as a joint enabler conforms to the intent of the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan's recommendation for common metrics and processes. However, DoD policy does not attempt to standardize consolidation practices for all services into a common process to be used by all services. But without a standardized policy across the services on materiel consolidation at the strategic level, how can Joint theater distribution systems be effectively planned and optimized?
Consolidation policy within DoD Regulation 4500.9-R should be changed to ensure consolidation standardization across the services. A revised consolidation policy in DoD Regulation 4500.9-R should ensure:
• A standard process for all services.
• Maximization of pure multi-packs and 463L pallets.
• Use of DLA's DDSP CCP and DDJC CCP for consolidating all services' materiel, eliminating Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy's bypass of CCPs.
• Standardized labeling of General Services Administration (GSA), direct vendor, and credit card shipments, which then must be routed through DLA CCPs.
• Frequent publication of DODAAC consolidation and routing guidance by Combatant commanders, not individual component commands or services.
• Establishment of CCP bypass criteria for WWX.
MATERIEL AIR SHIPMENT POLICIES
Unlike in ODS, the December 2003 RAND study showed that the DTS was able to surge to meet the OIF requirements of high-priority shipments by air. 45 However, under current policy, Item is provisionally qualified for air shipment. This item will be routinely transported by air on a space available basis. 3
Item is qualified for air shipment. This item will be routinely (mandatory) transported by air.
5
Item is disqualified from air shipment. This item will not be transported by air. • Air Clearance: TP-1 and TP-2; Normal RDD: Julian Date; up to 500 lbs. Challenge:
Over 500 lbs.
• Air Challenge all: TP-1, TP-2, and TP-3 with blank RDD. 50 51 Army policy for units designated by the major Army command (MACOM) as MILALOC provides for air clearance or air clearance challenge under the following conditions:
• Air Clearance: TP-1 and TP-2; Any RDD; up to 10000 lbs. Challenge: Over 10000 lbs.
• Air Clearance: TP-3; AEC-1; up to 1500 lbs. Challenge: Over 1500 lbs.
• Air Clearance: TP-3; AEC-3; up to 1000 lbs. Challenge: Over 1000 lbs.
• Air Challenge all: TP-3; AEC-5. • Air Clearance: TP-1 with any RDD or blank RDD; up to 300 lbs or up to 500 lbs for afloat forces. Challenge: TP-1; any RDD or blank RDD; Over 300 lbs. or over 500
lbs. for afloat forces.
• Air Clearance: TP-2 with RDD 777, 555, 444, or within 8 days of requisition; up to 300 lbs or up to 500 lbs for afloat forces. Challenge: TP-1; any RDD or blank RDD; Over 300 lbs. or over 500 lbs. for afloat forces.
• Air Challenge all: TP-3 or shipment cost in excess of $5000. 54 For Marine Corps shipments (S-TAC) funded by DLA, Marine policy provides for air clearance or air clearance challenge under the following conditions:
• Air Clearance: TP-1 and TP-2 with any RDD or blank RDD; up to 2500 lbs. or 250 ft 3 • Air Challenge all: TP-3 except for air eligible sensitive or security shipments with a short shelf life. 55 
NAVY AIR CLEARANCE POLICY
Navy policy also does not distinguish between the two major modes of air shipment, MILAIR and MILALOC. Navy materiel is not shipped through a CCP and thus becomes MILAIR by default. The Navy challenges a greater majority of its shipments because the Navy uses mass over velocity by stocking 90 days of stores on most ships. Navy air clearance policy provides for air clearance or air clearance challenge under the following conditions:
• Air Clearance: TP-1 and TP-2; RDD: 999, NMCS, PMCS or requisition less than 90 days old; less than 100 lbs.; less than 15 ft 3 ; air transportation less than $4000.
Challenge: TP-1 and TP-2; RDD: Other than above or blank; requisition 90 days or older; 100 lbs or more; air transportation cost $4000 or more. • Air Clearance: TP-1; RDD: 999 Challenge: None meeting this requirement.
• Air Clearance: A-TAC; TP-1 and TP-2; RDD: Any other than blank or 999; less than 250 lbs.; less than 25 ft 3 . Challenge (excluding TP-1 with RDD: 999): exceeds 250 lbs.; exceeds 25 ft 3 .
• Air Clearance: S-TAC; TP-1 and TP-2; RDD: Any other than blank or 999; less than 500 lbs.; less than 50 ft 3 . Challenge (excluding TP-1 with RDD: 999): exceeds 500 lbs.; exceeds 50 ft 3 .
• Air Challenge all: TP-2 and TP-3 with RDD: blank.
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NO CONSISTENT AIR CLEARANCE POLICY
The services policies for air clearance are consistent only in that high-priority cargo is authorized air shipment. However, the criteria for TP-1 shipments vary greatly in their thresholds of overweight shipments which will be challenged and perhaps denied. 
CONCLUSION
Using guidance in the Focused Logistics Campaign Plan, this SRP analyzed supply distribution system performance to assess policy on materiel consolidation at CCPs and compared the services' different policies on air clearance. Policy and practices at the strategic distribution level significantly impact the effectiveness of the theater distribution system and DTS. A distribution-based supply system can be effective if enabled at all levels of the supply chain. However, if the joint distribution system is not prepared for the required wartime surge in capacity and common logistics policies are not established, understood, and enforced, the overall distribution system will not be wholly effective.
Joint doctrine designates the primary tenants of joint theater distribution as visibility, capacity, and control. All three of these tenants must function effectively in order for joint theater distribution to succeed in expeditionary operations. Joint doctrine establishes centralized management as one of the guiding principles of an effective distribution system. 58 But currently the services observe different policies on consolidating materiel for air shipment as well as clearance for air shipment of materiel. These policy differences, coupled with different supply chain management systems for each service, weaken the capability of the DTS to effectively support each service's supply chain. The Focused Logistics Campaign Plan calls for consistence in policy and process. Most importantly however, common policy and processes enable the services to operate as a joint force with maximum interoperability of logistics operations.
The DoD should develop new policy and doctrine to ensure an interoperable and standardized distribution system. Specifically, the DoD should revise DoD Regulation 4500.9-R to enable standard processes for all services. The revision should include the following:
maximizing pure multi-packs and 463L pallets; using DLA's CCPs to consolidate all services' materiel; labeling standardization of GSA, direct vendor, and credit card shipments; publishing consolidation and routing guidance by Combatant commanders; and standardizing air clearance criteria. These changes would help enable a more effective joint distribution system. WORD COUNT=5981
